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Second Thoughts: A Response to David A. 
Logan’s Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking 
New York Times v. Sullivan 
DAVID A. ANDERSON 
New York Times v. Sullivan1 (NYT) was not wrongly decided. In its time and 
context, it was a necessity. I do not understand Professor Logan to be saying 
otherwise; his point is that the time and context are very different now, and what 
may have been right in 1964 may be wrong now.2 With that I agree. 
It is easy to forget just how bad the bad old days were. Before NYT, libel 
law as inherited from England was so myopically focused on detail that it 
countenanced a half-million-dollar award for publication of a statement whose 
gist was undeniably true: Southern officials were indeed violating the rights of 
African-Americans.3 Some of the details were false and, standing alone, were 
defamatory.4 But it was the larger, truthful message that outraged Commissioner 
Sullivan and other officials in the South.5 And the law of defamation was so 
byzantine that it allowed Sullivan (who was not identified in the statement) to 
claim that most of misdeeds attributed to unidentified  “Southern violators” had 
not happened, but if they had occurred, he would have been understood to be 
one of the perpetrators.6 
The common law in 1964 offered scant protection for error. For example, 
even reporting of arrests and criminal charges was perilous; accurate reports of 
judicial proceedings were usually privileged, but reporting on the actions of 
police and prosecutors were not—so editors were told not to publish anything 
about arrests and charges until a court acted.7 Even opinions could be actionable 
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1 263 U.S. 254 (1964). 
2 David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759, 761–63 (2020). 
3 See New York Times Co., 263 U.S. at 256. 
4 Id. at 258–59. 
5 Id. at 258. 
6 Id. 
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if they implied the existence of defamatory facts.8 Worse, libel law was state 
law, with many state-to-state variations.9 This may have been tolerable when 
news was largely the province of city newspapers, but, at the time of NYT, 
national TV networks, national newsmagazines, and regional and national 
papers were becoming dominant.10 For them, evaluating the legal perils they 
might face in different jurisdictions was daunting. 
Libel law needed to be nationalized. Perhaps that would have been better 
left to federal legislation, but subsequent experience with proposals that would 
have made far smaller incursions into state prerogatives suggests that was not 
likely to happen; proposals for a national retraction statute11 and  a federal shield 
law to protect confidential sources have failed repeatedly in the years since 
1964.12 
NYT nationalized libel law significantly. The new constitutional rules did 
not trump all state law, but they created a national floor that made it feasible to 
publish (or broadcast) regionally or and nationally.13 No matter what state’s law 
might control, and whatever the local peculiarities of that law, media and other 
speakers knew they could rely on the constitutional rules.14 Without those 
protections, much of our history would have been different. The strategy of the 
civil rights movement was to force the rest of the nation to pay attention to what 
was happening in the South; that is why its leaders bought an ad in the Times.15 
Without fearless coverage by the national media, that strategy could not have 
succeeded. The trajectory of the Vietnam war was altered by disclosure of the 
lies that were being told—disclosures might have remained hidden if the press 
had not had the protections of NYT. The Washington Post probably could not 
have exposed the Watergate scandal if it had faced the pre-1964 libel law. 
Professor Logan is right: NYT changed the political culture of America—but in 
many respects, those changes were for the better. 
 
8 See Logan, supra note 2, at 765 (noting that Alabama libel law “made any printed 
misstatement that harmed reputation not just actionable but potentially the basis for a large 
damages award”). 
9 A Closer Look at New York Times v. Sullivan, UM NEWS (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://news.miami.edu/stories/2019/02/a-closer-look-at-new-york-times-v-sullivan.html. 
10 See, e.g., STEVE M. BARKIN, AMERICAN TELEVISION NEWS: THE MEDIA 
MARKETPLACE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 35–45 (2003). 
11 See Elad Peled, Constitutionalizing Mandatory Retraction in Defamation Law, 30 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 33, 58–64 (2007) (detailing one such scholarly proposal for a 
federal retraction statute). 
12 See Federal Shield Law Efforts, REPS. COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
https://www.rcfp.org/federal-shield-law/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2020) (detailing more recent 
Congressional efforts for a national statute). 
13 New York Times Co., 263 U.S. at 283–84 (1964). 
14 See Logan, supra note 2, at 763–67. 
15 See id. 
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The decision was also a political necessity; every member of the Court 
recognized that. The health, if not the life, of our first truly national newspaper 
was threatened by multiple judgments awarded by hometown juries in favor of 
segregationists and affirmed by sympathetic judges.16 Other national media, 
most notably CBS, were similarly threatened.17 Imagine the consequences if the 
Supreme Court had affirmed Sullivan’s judgment, or even passively preserved 
it by denying certiorari: other Southern politicians and judges would have been 
emboldened and the civil rights movement (and the media who were helping 
that movement succeed by covering it) would have been intimidated if not 
neutered. 
The posture in which the case reached the Court was responsible for some 
of the problems that Professor Logan identifies. It was far from an ideal case for 
major changes in libel law—a useful reminder that the Court’s ability to choose 
the vehicle for its most dramatic innovations is limited. The Court’s usual 
disposition of erroneous judgments—simply reversing and remanding—was not 
an option; on remand the Alabama courts most likely would have found for 
Sullivan again. To avoid that, the Court announced two of the new rules that 
Professor Logan decries. It avoided allowing a future jury to decide whether 
actual malice had been proved by holding that judges (including justices of the 
Supreme Court) must independently review the evidence to decide if it could 
support such a finding.18 The Court concluded that it could not.19 To facilitate 
that conclusion, the Court adopted a second new rule: a finding of actual malice 
had to be supported by “clear and convincing” evidence.20 If the usual 
preponderance of evidence standard controlled, and if reasonable minds could 
differ, even appellate courts would have to give considerable deference to the 
findings below.21 Under the new standard, whether reasonable minds could 
differ did not matter; the Court could decide for itself whether the evidence was 
clear and convincing.22 
As Professor Logan says, these two changes “fundamentally altered the 
procedural rules for defamation litigation.”23 If the decision had merely adopted 
the actual malice requirement, it would not have greatly affected libel litigation; 
it would have just prescribed some new language that had to be included in the 
 
16 Id. 
17 Martin Garbus, New Challenge to Press Freedom, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 1984), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/29/magazine/new-challenge-to-press-freedom.html. 
18 Logan, supra note 2, at 772. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See Harte-Hanks Commc’n Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n. 2 (1989). 
22 Logan, supra note 2, at 772. 
23 Id. at 789. 
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jury instructions. But independent review and convincing clarity meant that few 
cases would ever reach a jury. Since judges would have to ultimately decide the 
actual malice question anyway, they could now do so on pre-trial motions for 
summary judgment. They did not have to wait for a jury determination, because 
the question was whether the evidence showed actual malice with convincing 
clarity, and that was a question for judges to answer ultimately.24 
These two rules, employed in anticipation of resistance by the Alabama 
courts, proved to be at least as important as the actual malice standard itself. 
Courts in other states turned out to be recalcitrant also. Over the next ten years, 
the Court reversed fourteen judgments that failed to fully comply with the new 
legal regime prescribed by NYT.25 Professor Logan notes that decades later, 
apparently many lower courts still were not complying, as indicted by a high 
rate of reversals on appeal.26 Judges’ reluctance to accept NYT’s easy disregard 
of jury findings may arise from centuries of history. In the eighteenth century, 
reforms of libel law took the crucial issues in defamation cases away from 
judges and gave them to juries.27 These were hailed in both England and 
America as major victories for freedom of speech and press, because jurors were 
expected to be more attentive to those freedoms than judges.28 Thus, for many 
judges, NYT and its progeny were a repudiation of received historical wisdom. 
The cases that followed did more than NYT itself to create the “miasma” 
that Professor Logan decries.29 As he says, NYT was firmly rooted in the desire 
to promote discussion about matters related to self-government.30 But as time 
passed, the Court and lower courts drifted farther and farther from that objective. 
The first step was to extend the NYT protections to suits by public employees 
far less important than L. B. Sullivan: to those who appear to the public to have 
“control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”31 Next were candidates for 
public office, no matter how lowly;32 then private individuals who “shape events 
 
24 Id. at 791. 
25 See David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PENN. L. REV. 
487, 488 n.2 (1991) for a list of all of the Supreme Court cases decided in the ten years 
following the NYT decision. Of the 27 heard at the time of publication of Anderson’s article, 
the fourteen decided between 1964 and 1974 were all reversed. Id. 
26 Logan, supra note 2, at 793. 
27 Anderson, supra note 25, at 539. 
28 That was the key reform of the 1735 Zenger case, one of the icons of press freedom 
in the United States. See THE TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER: AUGUST 4, 1735 47–48 (1765). 
29 Logan, supra note 2, at 761. 
30 Id. at 775. 
31 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1965). 
32 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 277 (1971). 
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in areas of concern to society at large”;33 then people who become famous 
simply for their success in sports, arts, or business.34 Eventually, the NYT regime 
applied to nearly anyone whose activities attract media attention. 
The result of the NYT decision, and the hundreds of cases that are often 
called its “progeny,” was that most libel cases ended with summary judgment 
for defendants.35 This did more than anything to free media from the chill of 
libel law, because it greatly reduced the cost of defending. And by fostering a 
perception that suing for libel is futile, it exacerbated the debasement of public 
debate that Professor Logan describes.36 
Of course, the decision is not entirely responsible for that debasement.  
Professor Logan identifies other important causes: the advent of the internet and 
social media,37 increasing partisanship in politics,38 growing hostility toward 
government (much of that earned by official mendacity),39 and distrust of the 
news media, much of that earned by arrogance and unresponsiveness of the 
media outlets themselves.40 These forces cannot be entirely disaggregated—
often one of them was triggered or exacerbated by the others. But change 
requires us to start someplace, and the diminished law of libel is a good starting 
point. 
My own nomination for the place to start is Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, which absolves internet platforms of legal 
responsibility for the content posted on their sites.41 It was passed because 
Congress was told it was necessary if internet companies were to monitor their 
platforms for child pornography; that was how it was smuggled into something 
called the Communications Decency Act.42 It was not necessary for that 
purpose, and in fact the companies still do very little of that monitoring.  
Replacing Section 230 with some sensible rules as to the responsibilities of 
platforms for the content they host would do much to clean up the social media 
morass. 
 
33 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 337 (1974) (citing Curtis Pub. Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren, J. concurring)). 
34 See, e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 525 F.2d 265, 1280 (3d Cir. 
1979) (en banc) (professional football player); James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 839 
(N.Y. 1976) (belly dancer). 
35 See Anderson, supra note 25, at 498. 
36 Logan, supra note 2, at 812–13. 
37 Id. at 800. 
38 See id. at 796–97. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2016). 
42 See id. 231(a)(1) (2016). 
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Section 230 is also on Professor Logan’s list of targets,43 but I would move 
it to the top of the list. Changing the constitutional law of defamation would 
take a long time. The Supreme Court could overrule NYT with one decision, but 
just as it took a generation or more to build up all of its accoutrements, so it 
would take many years to decide how many of those to undo, and to what extent. 
Section 230 can be changed just by an Act of Congress, though that is easier 
said than done. Not only would it encounter the opposition of technology 
companies that have become the behemoths of the economy (in part because of 
their lack of accountability). It also would disappoint millions of people who 
might find their defamatory falsehoods on Twitter, Facebook, and similar 
platforms blocked if those services had to take responsibility for them.44 But 
there seems to be some political momentum to address the evils of Section 230, 
while reforming the constitutional law of libel seems to lack much of a 
constituency. 
But Professor Logan is correct to say that NYT needs to be revisited. Some 
might fault him for not offering more detailed prescriptions for change, but the 
brevity of that section of his paper may be a virtue. We all have our own ideas 
about what needs to be saved and what changed. Extensive recommendations 
might distract us from his central demand—we must recognize that the world of 
NYT no longer exists. Understanding how much politics, news, and public 
discourse have changed is an essential prerequisite to reforming libel law. 
At the same time, it is important to also understand how much attitudes 
about reputation have changed. Reputation has acquired a bad name. Its 
importance was once acclaimed by everyone from Shakespeare45 to Donald 
Trump.46 Now bad reputation, at least in the eyes of the general public, seems 
to have few consequences. People with reputations tarnished by reported (or 
even confirmed) transgressions can be elected to high office, exalted in popular 
culture, or esteemed as sports heroes. To be sure, reputation still matters in many 
subcultures: in professions where advancement or referrals depend on peer 
esteem, in businesses where the now-ubiquitous consumer reviews can mean 
success or failure, and among cliques of teenagers where inclusion and 
exclusion are the coin of the realm. But in the society at large, reputation no 
longer has the power it once had. 
 
43 Logan, supra note 2, at 811. 
44 To say nothing of the opposition of one person who with the stroke of a pen could 
preserve his freedom to Tweet falsehoods. 
45 “Reputation, reputation, reputation! O, I have lost my reputation! I have lost the 
immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. My reputation, Iago, my reputation!” 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE act 2, sc. 3. 
46 “I really value my reputation and I don’t hesitate to sue.” Michael Kruse, The 199 
Most Donald Trump Things Donald Trump has ever Said, POLITICO (Aug. 14, 2015), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/the-absolute-trumpest-121328. 
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Whether the law’s diminished protection of reputation is a cause or effect 
of this is not clear. Probably it is both. Many people have become skeptical (or 
cynical) about the validity of untarnished reputations. Some seem to believe that 
everyone’s character is flawed; others seem to believe that anyone who has 
achieved fame must have cheated or lied along the way. People with these views 
will not welcome changes in law that make it harder for the media and others to 
confirm their suspicions. An even greater impediment may be the intellectually 
fashionable view that truth is merely a social construct: if one person’s 
falsehood is another person’s truth, there is little room for a body of law that 
insists that falsity can be proved. However valid that view may be as a cosmic 
matter, on the ground it is nonsense: we distinguish between truth and falsity 
every day of our lives. 
Professor Logan’s article is perceptive, timely, and courageous. He will face 
some vituperation for questioning a decision as iconic as NYT. But he has 
initiated a much-needed conversation. 
